Indian Army personnel during a counter-terror operation in Kathua district in June this year.
Credit: PTI Photo
The findings of the 1999 Kargil Review Committee Report start with these words; “…the Pakistani armed intrusion in Kargil sector came as a complete and total surprise to the government, army, and intelligence agencies…” In fact, “surprise” is a leitmotif that runs, unbroken, through independent India’s national security discourse. The onus of responsibility for national security was placed squarely on the politician’s shoulders, by Prussian strategist Carl von Clausewitz’s dictum, that war was a “branch of political activity”. Consequently, understanding the compulsions of national security and evolving strategies for achieving security objectives have become the sine qua non of the civil-military security establishments of major powers.
In India, Clausewitz’s dictum has been implemented somewhat selectively. While adherence to the principle of “civilian control” has ensured that the soldier remains subordinate to the elected representatives, the latter has delegated the exercise of authority to the defence bureaucracy, and both have remained ambivalent about their responsibility vis-à-vis national security.
The creation of two new entities in 2020 after decades of procrastination by successive governments — a Department of Military Affairs (DMA) and a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) — was deemed the most significant national security reform since Independence for two reasons. Not only did the CDS become the first ever military officer to be recognised as a government functionary in the “Allocation of Business Rules”, but the onus of management of the armed forces, also shifted, from the Defence Secretary to the CDS. Paradoxically, the responsibility for the “defence of India, and every part, thereof,” still remains with the civilian Defence Secretary.
The decision to go to war should come only after politicians and diplomats have exhausted all other avenues of dispute resolution. If war is, indeed, a political compulsion, it must be waged with the aim of eliminating the underlying casus belli to achieve enduring peace. This places three responsibilities on the country’s political leadership: (a) to lay down clear aims for every military operation; (b) to specify the desired ‘end-state’ before conflict-termination; and (c) to ensure that adequate resources are provided, well in time, for warfighting.
Unfortunately, in India, these stipulations have been disregarded time and again because the Indian politician has remained detached from issues related to national security. In 77 years of independence, no government has ever undertaken a defence review, or issued a defence white paper, or a national security doctrine/strategy. Total preoccupation with election-related pursuits leaves our political-order little time or mental space to devote to national security, except when it is seen as a “vote-catcher”.
The long-term security policies of a state must be rooted in perceptions of its vital interests, and guided by a long-term vision of its place in the regional or world order. Therefore, all major powers undertake periodic reviews of their evolving national security objectives, the options available, and the economic and military means available for achieving them. Such reviews automatically generate assessments of existing or potential adversary threats, as well as own military’s material state, capabilities and readiness.
From here, it is a short step to estimation of capability, shortcomings and the funding support that the national exchequer must generate. Apart from providing fiscal guidance, this process also facilitates the evolution of a national security strategy. By not undertaking these exercises, the government deprives itself of a holistic national security picture with regard to: where we stand, where we want to go and how we intend to get there.
Technological advancement
Moreover, given the rapid pace of technological advancement, the absence of a long-term roadmap creates seemingly intractable issues for the military. Our stalled transition to theatre commands is a proximate example. Recent conflicts have thrown up other posers for the military, such as the role of cyber and drone warfare, employment of armoured forces, vulnerability of warships at sea and continued relevance of manned aircraft in combat. Such force-architecture conundrums can only be resolved in the context of a larger national-level strategic vision.
Other nations have shown greater clarity and resolve. In the Indo-Pacific region alone, the past five years have seen 14 countries issuing national security strategies, policies or defence white papers. Apart from major powers like the US, China and Japan, this list includes Australia, Indonesia, Vietnam, South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines. Of interest is China’s example. Its political leadership has, since 1995, been issuing a defence white paper (DWP) every two years. The 11 DWPs issued so far — all public documents — discuss geo-political objectives, force structures and defence-economics, against the backdrop of clearly stated national security aims, objectives and challenges.
India’s National Security Secretariat has produced many draft strategy documents, but none have seen the light of day. Regardless of this vacuum, the three armed forces have gone ahead, and issued doctrines or strategies, or both, with the stated objectives of providing, for example; “broad tenets for the prosecution of operations, across the entire spectrum of conflict”; or “strategic guidance for growth, development and deployment of the service”. However, in the absence of formally enunciated national aims and security objectives, and given the silence of MoD and Parliament on such issues, one wonders about the degree of conformity between the military’s doctrinal thought-process, and the politician’s Weltanschauung (world view).
The world’s most populous nation, and fifth largest economy, India is a nuclear weapon state with a military that counts amongst the largest in the world, and a defence budget of US $ 75 billion. And yet, there is a view that India “punches below its weight” because Indian statecraft has been unable to leverage its significant national power to deter or dissuade neighbours from undertaking actions inimical to its interests.
As he commences his second innings in the MoD, our Raksha Mantri may note that his Chinese counterpart, Admiral Dong Jun, was till January 2024, the serving PLA Navy chief. This, first-ever appointment of a career naval officer as head of China’s armed forces, is a testament to the importance Xi Jinping has placed on bringing professional expertise to bear on the ongoing transformation of China’s national security and military, in general, and its navy in particular.
The scale, complexity and diversity of security challenges that India faces today will continue to test the acumen of its statesmen, diplomats and soldiers. In this milieu, coherent security policies will serve to dispel perceptions of laxity or indifference towards national security and grand strategy. Using all its tools of statecraft, India needs to evolve a holistic national security strategy that will guarantee, firstly, a safe breathing spell for the country to build its economic, industrial and military sinews; and thereafter, the effective employment of its comprehensive power to stand up to external adversaries.
(Admiral Arun Prakash retired as the chief of Indian Navy and the chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee in 2006)