Jabin T Jacob
Credit: Special Arrangement
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping held “their first proper bilateral meeting at delegation level in nearly five years” on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia. Coming in the wake of an announcement earlier this week of a new patrolling agreement on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) “leading to disengagement and a resolution of the issues that had arisen in these areas in 2020”, there was much expectation of more details following the meeting of the two leaders.
The details that have become available subsequently – not always through official sources – however, also raise several questions and implications.
The ‘legacy disputes’
In response to a couple of questions in a briefing on 22 October, the day before the bilateral meeting, Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri noted that “in the pending areas under discussion, patrolling and indeed grazing activities, wherever applicable, will revert to the situation as it obtained in 2020”. In a press briefing following the meeting, he described the deal as “the disengagement and patrolling agreement” and in response to a specific question on Depsang and Demchok – the so-called “legacy disputes”, in the Western Sector – stated that “the agreement that has been arrived at essentially pertains to these areas”.
Even before Misri’s announcements, a media report had indicated that patrolling in Depsang will go back to the pre-2017 (pre-Doklam) status, while subsequent reports say that disengagement at both points is proceeding with some temporary structures being removed and troops shifting “a little” from stand-off points.
Misri noted that “as far as the disengagement agreements reached previously are concerned, those agreements were not reopened in these discussions”. It means that the buffer zones of no patrolling created in these previous agreements to cover friction points remain in place. These have been a source of disaffection in sections of the Indian strategic community. Army Chief, Gen. Upendra Dwivedi seemed to highlight his own concerns in a public speech following the announcement of the patrolling agreement.
‘Normalisation’?
On the larger question of the boundary dispute itself, the Foreign Secretary declared that “the restoration of peace and tranquillity in the border areas will create space for returning us towards the path of normalization of our bilateral relations”. Following the Modi-Xi meeting, it was announced that the Special Representatives (SRs) “will meet at an early date to oversee the management of peace and tranquillity in border areas and to explore a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable solution to the boundary question”. While “management” can be taken to mean they will oversee the “next steps” following the patrolling agreement, it is not clear how they can talk about resolution without these steps of de-escalation and de-induction being completed. Further, if bilateral agreements on the LAC worked out over decades of negotiations were ignored in 2020, it is not clear if they continue to be relevant or if they will be respected by the Chinese henceforth.
Modi’s wider remarks at the BRICS summit also offer some clues about what ‘normalization’ might look like. His call for “people centric” BRICS cooperation could indicate a possible uptick in economic engagement. Resumption of direct flights between India and China is possibly on the cards while issuing of business visas to Chinese technicians has already improved.
However, it is not clear if journalists from the other country will now be allowed back in. There are also other reminders of the difficulties in the relationship. For instance, despite talk of increasing financial integration among BRICS countries, “trade in local currencies and smooth cross-border payments” seem unlikely with China given Indian sensitivities. Similarly, the Indian Prime Minister’s statement on “no place for double standards” on counterterrorism is a clear hint about China’s record.
The path towards ‘normalisation’ of India-China ties looks neither smooth nor easy.
(The writer teaches international relations at Shiv Nadar University, Delhi NCR.)