After considerable buzz in our strategic community about the recent Indian move to seek modification of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), External Affairs Minister Jaishankar has put things in perspective by describing it as a technical matter to be discussed by officials of both sides. In reality, it is neither the launch of the water brahmastra that some of our strategic experts have been calling for, nor a mere technical matter, as stated by Jaishankar, possibly to scotch the brahmastra expectation.
During every India-Pakistan crisis, a segment of our strategic community has called for India’s withdrawal from the IWT. Even if we ignore the legal implications of such a move (the treaty provides for its termination only through mutual consent) or decide to brazen it out, the above suggestion is not practical. We have not utilised even our own share of water under the treaty, much less build the costly and time-consuming infrastructure through difficult mountainous terrain to divert to our water-starved plains Pakistan’s share from the rivers Indus, Jhelum and Chenab. Without such infrastructure, a unilateral withdrawal by India will be a largely hollow move.
An elaborate framework, resulting from eight years of hard work (1952-60), the treaty worked well for the first 50 years or so, but differences have grown as India has stepped up building run of the river hydroelectric projects, permitted under the treaty, on the aforementioned three rivers. What India has asked for is modification of the treaty under its Article XII (3), which permits it, once again, through mutual consent. The scope of the changes desired by India is not clear, though media reports, attributed to government sources, allude to at least three aspects.
First, the existing treaty provisions for resolution of differences and disputes concerning its implementation provide for a graded mechanism of Indus Commissioners of the two countries trying to resolve the issue, followed by a neutral expert; and only largely complex legal issues that cannot be resolved as above being referred to a Court of Arbitration (COA).
As per the treaty, the World Bank has a role in the appointment of a neutral expert or members of COA. Of late, Pakistan has shown the tendency to take every matter to COA. Thus, after initially requesting for a neutral expert to address its objections to India’s Kihanganga and Ratle hydroelectric projects in 2015, it changed its mind in 2016 and asked for a COA. India favoured referring these issues to a neutral expert. Since the two parties could not agree on a single mechanism, the World Bank took the unprecedented step last year of appointing both a neutral expert and constituting a COA. The move has the potential of different verdicts on the issues in question being pronounced by the two mechanisms. (India stayed away from the first sitting of the COA on January 27). Therefore, India would like greater clarity in the treaty provisions regarding the issues to be decided by a neutral expert or a COA. This appears to have been the immediate trigger for India’s move.
Second, the treaty requires India to provide the technical parameters of a hydroelectric project to be constructed to Pakistan at least six months before the commencement of river works. The idea is to give Pakistan some time to seek any clarifications that it may require. However, in practice, Pakistan has sought to use this provision as a veto over the Indian projects by continuing to raise objections well beyond the period of six months. India would want greater clarity on this aspect, too.
Third, official sources have been quoted as saying that they would like to “incorporate the lessons learned over the last 62 years” in the treaty. This would include new techniques that have been developed after conclusion of the treaty in 1960. For example, drawdown flushing to remove sedimentation from the reservoirs of hydroelectric projects is not permitted under the treaty. Pakistan has continued to object to its use by India. There have also been other developments. Thus, the Standing Committee of Parliament on Water Resources recommended in 2021 a renegotiation of the treaty to take into account the impact of climate change on water availability in the Indus basin and other challenges that are not covered under the treaty. Pakistan has its own ideas on climate change and has been accusing India of deforestation in Kashmir, with an adverse impact on rainfall and the quantity of water in the rivers flowing to it. In this context, one has come across some commentaries in Pakistan calling for joint environmental management by the two countries in the catchment area in Kashmir – which would be a no-no for India. This is also an indicator of the contrasting narratives on the issue in the two countries.
The discussions for the modification of the treaty, though technical, would involve deep emotions on both sides in view of the precious resource involved -- water. Pakistan is a water-stressed country. Its per capita availability of water has come down from around 5,500 cubic metres in 1947 to 1,000 cubic metres or less. India’s position is not much better, with per capita availability of around 1,400 cubic metres. There has all along been a body of opinion in India that Delhi gave away too much in conceding 80% water of the Indus basin to Pakistan under the treaty. As the lower riparian, Pakistan has hung on to the treaty for dear life and would be very apprehensive about any changes.
Handled maturely, the modification exercise could add considerable value to the treaty; or else, as is more likely in the current environment, it could end up in utter acrimony.
The problem is not so much the word of the treaty as the deep trust deficit between the two countries.
A cooperative spirit and a more normal bilateral relationship would have resulted in much better use of the waters covered by the treaty, for example through joint hydroelectric projects on both sides. Pakistan should also realise that in trying to exploit the word of the treaty to block Indian projects, it could end up seriously eroding Indian cooperation, which is so essential to preserve its spirit. Signalling this may also be one of the motives behind the Indian demarche.
(The writer is a former High Commissioner to Pakistan and author of the book ‘India’s Pakistan Conundrum: Managing a Complex Relationship’)