Pope Francis delivers his address during a meeting with members of the clergy, seminarians and catechists, at the Cathedral of the Immaculate Conception, during his apostolic trip to Asia, in Dili, East Timor, September 10, 2024.
Credit: Reuters Photo
Pope Francis is making an Asia-Pacific tour that’s about more than spreading the word or connecting with the devout. It is a run-through for the ultimate prize the Roman Catholic Church covets: a visit to China.
By some estimates, the world’s second-largest economy is on track to have the biggest population of Christians by 2030. The pope has been keen to engage with the Chinese Communist Party, which has historically controlled the appointment of bishops in the country, independent of the Vatican. This has led to worries of a schism, one of the many reasons the pontiff wants to unify China’s Catholics.
His overtures come despite the nation’s worsening track record on religious freedoms. Any future outreach can’t downplay these concerns, or compromise the Vatican’s diplomatic relations with Taiwan, one of the few remaining examples of recognition that the self-ruled island — which Beijing claims as its own — still has.
No pope has ever visited China, and the Holy See doesn’t have official diplomatic relations with it, despite pursuing closer ties over the last few years. The trip is being viewed as a way to engage with Beijing, but that shouldn’t discount the importance of Francis’s current tour to four Asian nations, many of which have sizeable Catholic populations: Indonesia (3 per cent, 8 million) Papua New Guinea (26 per cent, approximately 3 million), Timor-Leste (97 per cent, 1.5 million) and Singapore — home to almost 400,000 Catholics, or 7 per cent of the population, many ethnically Chinese — and the last leg of his historic voyage this week.
Still, China is watching very closely. The Communist Party is officially atheist, and forbids its members from having a religion. But that dogma has evolved over time and the current constitution, adopted in 1982, states that ordinary citizens enjoy “freedom of religious beliefs.”
What this means in practice, though, is that all faiths are under President Xi Jinping’s control. His Sinicization program, introduced in 2015, stipulates religious groups must adapt to socialism, by integrating their beliefs and customs with Chinese culture and political ideology. So in other words, you have the right to worship — but with Chinese characteristics.
“This is not the China of the past, there is no systematic enforcement of atheism now,” Michel Chambon, research fellow at the Asia Research Institute at the National University of Singapore, told me. “The party is not interested in how you celebrate Mass. Officials just want to ensure that Catholic networks cannot be mobilized against them.”
The relationship between the church and China is complex. Religion was essentially banned during the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s and ’70s, but flourished in the 1980s after the country entered an era of economic reforms. Roughly 2 per cent of Chinese adults, or about 20 million people, self-identify with Christianity, according to the 2018 Chinese General Social Survey. Protestants account for roughly 90 per cent of those, while the remainder are mostly Catholics.
A 2022 US State Department report pointed to some 10 million to 12 million Catholics, noting that many have to practice their faith in secret, away from the scrutiny of officials. Those who refuse to join the government’s Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association or pledge allegiance to the party were harassed, detained, disappeared or imprisoned, it found.
Reaching out to the faithful is one reason behind the Vatican’s overtures to China, but it’s also about winning hearts and minds among believers divided into two groups: one under a state-controlled church, and the other that worships in “underground churches” whose bishops are not approved by Chinese authorities.
The Holy See has been fighting a battle with Beijing about who gets to appoint bishops, and in 2018 reached a compromise — candidates recognized by both would be appointed. For the Vatican, it was a way to bring more Chinese Catholics into the fold, but some high-profile figures in the Church, including the now retired Cardinal Joseph Zen of Hong Kong, worried it had ceded too much power.
At the time, Zen told Bloomberg that the pontiff was too optimistic about the Chinese government, and warned closer ties “will have tragic and long-lasting effects, not only for the Church in China, but for the whole Church.” His remarks were prescient. In 2022, Zen was fined after being found guilty on a charge relating to his role in a relief fund for Hong Kong’s pro-democracy protests in 2019, which he denied.
Taiwan is a pressing dilemma. The Vatican is among 12 diplomatic allies the island still has left. There are concerns these loyalties could shift, as the Holy See attempts to improve ties with Beijing. Regular meetings between Chinese clergy and their counterparts in Rome, a trend toward normalizing relations, and even discussions about setting up a “stable presence” by the Vatican in China, all point to an upgrading of that relationship.
Beijing’s efforts to switch international allegiances away from Taipei have been remarkably successful. Getting the Vatican on side would be a high-profile victory, but the Church has consistently maintained that it would never abandon Taipei. It is conceivable, given its religious authority, that it could have spiritual ties with both, and some Taiwanese have even asked the Holy See to press for “dual recognition.”
China won’t make that easy, given it’s animosity toward the island. The Vatican wants to bring all Catholics in China under its umbrella, but that cannot mean a compromise on issues of religious freedom, or a downgrading of its relationship with Taiwan. The Holy See is the island’s only diplomatic ally in Europe. A pope has never visited there, despite enjoying diplomatic ties for several decades. Casting aside Taiwan for growth in China would seriously damage the Church’s credibility as an upholder of spiritual principles.
The Vatican should be transparent about its agreements with Beijing rather than compromise to get deeper access in the country. Consistently voicing concerns about the treatment of the oppressed — a key moral value — should be part of any dialogue with the Communist Party.
As adherence to spirituality declines in the West, growth in the number of faithful will most likely come from Asia. Sacrificing principles for progress is not the way.