The RSS chief Mohan Bhagwat has yet again cited population growth as an important issue facing India today. In his annual Vijaydashami address to his cadres, he was quoted as saying: “Population control and religion-based population balance is an important subject that can no longer be ignored.” Population “control” is an oft-heard, if outdated, phrase across the spectrum; the need for population “balance” based particularly on religion lends it a sharp and predictable political edge.
At its root is still the 1980s language of “population control” to check growing numbers. The logic is that we must “control” population if we are to do well and provide for the numbers we already have. This simplistic presentation, bought by a large section of people, is a precursor to the demand for policy action that applies to all in theory but has its worst impacts in practice on those at the bottom of the pyramid, who tend to have more children. This is how the demand for the “two-child norm” would work – those who need support, subsidies, rations and other inputs the most cannot get them if they have more than two children.
There is enough data now to argue that this is not how population dynamics work to deliver the results that we may seek. For example, India’s Total Fertility Rate (TFR; loosely put, the number of children per woman) has consistently fallen. TFR was reported at 3.39 (NFHS-1, 1990-92), 2.85 (NFHS-2, 1996-98), 2.68 (NFHS-3, 2003-5), 2.18 (NFHS-4, 2015-16), and 1.99 (NFHS-5, 2019-21). Today, as many as 31 states and Union Territories, including all the states in the South, the West and the North region have fertility below 2.1, which is the replacement fertility rate (so-called because at this rate, a woman and her partner would have replaced themselves).
Yet, it will take some time for what is called “population momentum” to break because a large number of women are still in the reproductive age bracket. TFR is, of course, impacted by many factors. The number ranges from 1.1 children per woman in Sikkim to a high of 3.0 children per woman in Bihar. TFR among Muslims is higher than other religions at 2.36 (NFHS-5), but it too has been following a declining trend, going down over the years: 4.41 in NFHS-1, 3.59 in NFHS-2, 3.40 in NFHS-3, 2.62 in NFHS-4, and 2.36 in NFHS-5 – a faster decline than in Hindus.
It is possible to use the numbers to argue in many ways but what should be reasonable to note is that there is no conspiracy among a certain set of people to grow their numbers. Demographics tells us that as the level of education (particularly of the woman) and the standard of living of the family moves up, the number of children per woman generally comes down. The gap in TFR seen between rural and urban, between poorer and richer sections, and those with lower levels of schooling versus high school coverage, points to the close connection of population numbers with development indices at the grassroots.
The fertility rate therefore holds a mirror to how fast or slow the nation and sections thereof are moving to open opportunities for the weakest and the poorest. If the RSS can argue that we need to move faster on population, then the case must be for offering more opportunity to those not benefiting from India’s so-called growth story. The fertility rate will then take care of itself. Muslims and Hindus, rich and the poor, educated and the not-so-educated, have similar aspirations, ambitions and the desire for a decent standard of living. Some have benefited from the system; others have been left behind.
In this picture, the phraseology of “control” then works to put down the weakest. It denies State resources to those who need them the most. It turns attention away from what is urgently required in terms of development to a top-down command-and-control approach that treats people not as citizens with rights but subjects who must be controlled and punished. It refuses to recognise the approach and the language of sexual and reproductive rights and supplants it with power to bureaucrats, who understand little about the subject. One example of this is the police being used in many cases and areas of India to dictate behaviour to consenting adult couples; another recent example is that of a bureaucrat in Bihar who mocked a student and wondered if she would ask questions on contraceptives. The bureaucrat in this case later apologised.
As the late Prof Hans Rosling, who co-founded Médecins sans Frontièrs and is best known for offering insights from UN population data, once said: “The world “used to be 'we' and 'them.' And 'we' is the Western world and 'them' is the Third World.” The difference: the West had long life and small family. The Third World had short life and large family.”
Well, the world has moved on, and so has India. But we may end up creating a new “us” and “them” problem right within our borders if the issues are not presented in a fair and reasonable manner. Worse, this might also create policies that will go on for long years to impact how India progresses and how our resources are put to use. In the quest to control family size in particular ways and in select areas, we may be already embarking on a massive misallocation that will live on to harm the growth prospects of the nation. In that talk, Prof Rosling added about his students, “the problem for me was not ignorance; it was preconceived ideas.” The same can be said in the case of India today.
None of this is to say that family planning must not be encouraged, or that ‘infiltration’ is not to be stopped. The government can police the borders, provide more contraceptive choices, but without the concomitant developmental initiatives for people, none of the policing will yield results.
A good way to understand this is to read the population policy offered when Atal Behari Vajpayee was Prime Minister. That policy used the world “control” thrice, but it was to “control” HIV, to “control” diarrheal deaths, and to “control” communicable diseases. That itself is a herculean task, and the government will do well to focus on issues such as these rather than deciding the number of children a woman can bear in her lifetime.
(The writer is a journalist and faculty member at SPJIMR. Views are personal) (Through The Billion Press)