The speed with which the Taliban has taken over Afghanistan is seen by many as a victory for Pakistan and without the Imran-Khan led country, the Taliban may not have been as successful. The group may have at least faced some setbacks if not for the support from Pakistan. This brings one to wonder, what is Pakistan’s relationship with the Taliban, role in Afghanistan and what is in it for Pakistan?
How far back does the relationship go?
The thought that Pakistan has much to do with the takeover comes from the historical relationship that the group has had with Pakistan. Ever since the birth of the Taliban in 1994, after the Soviets left Afghanistan, Pakistan helped the Taliban take over the country in 1996.
And even during the US invasion and the “Global War on Terror”, Pakistan has for long sheltered its fighters and leaders. Quetta, the capital of Balochistan, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas dotted across the country, South and North Waziristan are said to have been safe havens and turnaround points for the Afghan Taliban, al-Qaeda, the Haqqani Network and a slew of other small terror groups associated with Afghanistan.
How Pakistan helped the Taliban
In fact, some of these areas have acted as bases for these groups over the past few months in helping the Taliban take over Afghanistan. These fighters are said to have been waltzing in and out of Afghanistan even as the Pakistani security establishment watched on.
In fact, the conquest of Spin Boldak, one of the major crossings between the two countries, saw celebratory rallies in Quetta. This is the battle in which Indian photojournalist Danish Siddiqui was killed and after the Taliban gained control of this border crossing, the speed with which the Taliban started to take over other regions in Afghanistan rose rapidly.
Demoralised by the haste in which US troops left the country, Afghan forces seem to have been overpowered rather rapidly since then. The then Ashraf Ghani-led government even accused the Pakistan Army and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of helping the Taliban.
In fact, Sheikh Rashid, a Pakistani minister, confessed in an interview with Geo News that Taliban fighters wounded in battle were being treated in Pakistani hospitals and that fighters who were killed were often buried in Pakistan where their families stayed. Police officers in Peshawar also said that rallies were held during funerals of Taliban fighters where pro-Taliban slogans were raised, according to several media reports.
This said, way back in the 1970s, Pakistan started supporting hardline Islamist groups that were against the Soviet-backed Daud Khan government. It is said that in the Soviet era, the Pakistani security establishment helped the Americans gain access to the mujahideen who would eventually fight Soviet forces and gain control of Afghanistan in 1979. These Afghans who formed the mujahideen continued to receive support from the US and Pakistan later on.
Taliban as Pakistan’s proxy
The Taliban is undoubtedly seen as a proxy for Pakistan. A Taliban-led government in Kabul would mean greater control over Afghanistan for Pakistani forces and intelligence. This control would provide the country with a strategic edge against India, securing Afghan routes from South to Central Asia.
The Karzai and Ghani governments were seen as India-friendly regimes and Pakistan feared India’s encirclement of Pakistan using relatively friendly regimes in Iran and Afghanistan. Pakistan believes they can cut off a coveted path to Central Asia using influence over the Taliban.
PM Imran Khan at an event pointed to the Taliban as an exemplar of empowering authenticity. He said that Afghans “had broken the shackles of slavery”. However, some of the country’s rhetoric seems contradictory. Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi said that Pakistan has ‘no favourites’ in Afghanistan and the country is on the same page with the international community when it comes to finding a political solution to the Afghan crisis.
Another aspect of the rise of the Taliban that may prove to benefit Pakistan is how the group sees itself as a “Pashtun nationalist force”, helping the Pakistani establishment quell the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM). The Taliban claim to be a true representation of the majority ethnic group in Afghanistan, however, this claim is questionable due to their well-documented ties with al-Qaeda and hardline Islamic stance. The Afghan government saw the PTM as a counter to the Taliban and openly reached out to them, helping them grow and gain legitimacy, much to the disdain of the Pakistani security establishment.
The American factor
The US used Pakistan, their ally, as a base for launching attacks on the Taliban ever since the invasion and even later on, as Pakistani forces controlled much of the access to Afghanistan and were an easy back-end office to set up for American forces. Though the Americans seem to have been aware of the relationship between Pakistani forces and the Taliban and the safe havens that the Taliban have in the country, the US could not afford to antagonise Pakistani intelligence or the army, as that would endanger American operations.
Another aspect of the American factor is how Pakistan controlled the talks between the Taliban, the Afghan government and the US government. Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, one of the co-founders of the Taliban, had once independently reached out to the Hamid Karzai-led Afghan government, ostensibly for a discussion on sharing power, which would not have been an ideal situation for Pakistan, and Baradar in 2010 was incarcerated. Baradar was released in 2018 when the Trump administration expressed seriousness in discussions with the Taliban. So, Pakistan effectively handed the Taliban leadership to the talks with the US; talks in which the Afghan government was conveniently excluded.
Blowbacks for Pakistan
A Taliban-led Afghanistan is not entirely favourable for Pakistan and there is some cause for concern in two major forms. First, Pakistan, in comparison to what the Taliban envision for Afghanistan, is a rather moderate Islamic state. A rise of a more extreme Islamic system in a neighbour may fan the flames of extremism which is not something the Pakistani establishment may fancy.
The growth of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP, also known as the Pakistani Taliban) may be detrimental to the Pakistani state. In fact, reports suggest that the former deputy leader of the TTP, Maulana Faqir Mohammad was released from an Afghan prison by the Taliban. Interior Minister Sheikh Rashid who is concerned about the TTP and other groups, said on Tuesday, “We have taken the Taliban on-board over the TTP issue and told them that Pakistan will not allow its soil to be used against Afghanistan and it is hoped that Afghanistan would also not allow its soil to be used against Pakistan.”
Pakistan Army chief General Bajwa, and Lieutenant General Faiz Hameed who is the head of the ISI, were quoted saying that the Pakistani Taliban and the Afghan Taliban were “two faces of the same coin”. These statements suggest fear of a resurgence of the TTP and rise in Islamic extremism in the country.
Second, a more immediate threat to Pakistan and its social and economic system is the massive influx of refugees fearing the Taliban and the violence that will ensue. A massive influx of refugees can cause a strain on an already struggling economy in Pakistan, not to mention how this may affect the Covid-19 situation in the country and how it may put the socio-economic structure into disarray.
A former Pakistani ambassador, now based out of Washington, and a critic of the Imran Khan-led government wrote, “These developments will take Pakistan further away from becoming ‘a normal country,’ perpetuating dysfunction at home and locking it into a foreign policy defined by hostility toward India and dependence on China.” He also wrote that the US-Pakistan relationship may worsen as the US may not forgive Pakistan for enabling the Taliban for decades.
How does it affect India?
Pakistan’s sense of threat from India arising out of the “encirclement” was partly due to the Chabahar port project and the multi-modal transport link to central Asia through Afghanistan that India undertook. In fact, India built the highway between Zaranj at the Afghan-Iran border through Delaram. An Afghanistan in which Pakistan has significant influence may adversely impact India’s connectivity project to Central Asia. It may likely lead to the closure of this route.
What may be of significant concern for India is the potential increase in terror activities in the sub-continent. NSA Ajit Doval’s memories of being a negotiator at Kandahar during the IC814 hijack would still be fresh and the threat of such attacks cannot be ruled out. The threat of groups like the Haqqani Network, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed may only increase as they gain more political legitimacy and see a growth in geographical and financial assets.
This also complicates the relationship India has with Pakistan and China. Both nations are eager to recognise a Taliban government whilst India will remain rather cautious. Any manoeuvre against the Taliban may cause worsening of already fraught relationships with the two neighbours. Thus, this adds another complicated layer to India’s diplomacy in the region.