A billboard on Enghelab square in Tehran depicting Qasem Soleimani, the assassinated commander of Iran’s Quds force, delivering weapons to Hamas.
Credit: Getty Images
The revelation that Iran is now able to enrich uranium to 83.7%, a hair’s breadth from weapons-grade capability, is a strategic game changer in a region that has endured almost continuous military and political conflict since the end of the Second World War.
Iran’s enhanced nuclear status, confirmed earlier this month by UK Defence Secretary Grant Shapps, is arguably more significant than any other development in the Middle East, more important than the war with Hamas in Gaza, the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hezbollah along the Lebanon and Syrian borders, and possibly even more important than the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea.
As the universally acknowledged sponsor of Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis, Iran must be taken into account in any attempt to reduce regional tensions. But Tehran’s new nuclear edge means Israel and its Western allies will have to think twice about retaliation because Iran is poised to emerge as the world’s 10th nuclear power, after the US, Russia, UK, France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea.
Last month, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told Israel’s parliamentary foreign and security affairs committee, “If Iran acquires nuclear weapons, this will be a problem for Israel in the long term. Our position is that there should be no compromise, we need to deal with the Iranian regime, and I am not going to elaborate further.” Last week, he hinted that Israel has started taking additional steps to confront a nuclear Iran. “Who said we are not attacking Iran”, he said at a press conference in Jerusalem last week. “Iran is the head of the octopus, it stands behind the Houthis and Hamas, we have a conflict with Iran. As the Prime Minister of Israel, I am committed to doing everything to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, not only for the sake of our security but for the security of the whole world.”
Another Israeli cabinet minister Nir Barkat told London’s Daily Telegraph how Iran is now a “legitimate target” for an Israeli missile strike. “They will not get away with it”, he said, referring to Tehran’s support for Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthis in Yemen. “The head of the snake is Tehran.”
For Iran’s mullahs, Israel is nothing more than a proxy for the US, which currently controls more than $100 billion in frozen Iranian bank assets. So, any future peace deal must start with unlocking at least some of those frozen assets, before moving on to reducing regional conflicts where Iran is such a major player.
The ability to enrich uranium to 83.7% at Iran’s Fordow and Natanz facilities is particularly noteworthy because it brings Iran dangerously close to the threshold of weapons-grade material, which is typically around 90%. It underlines the fears of an international community that has long been sceptical of Iranian officials’ claims that their nuclear activities are solely for peaceful purposes.
These are similar to the claims that used to be made by Pakistan. In 1985, then Pakistani President Gen Zia ul Haq told me face-to-face how his country was enriching uranium beyond the internationally agreed limit of 5%. One year later, Western experts agreed this enrichment capability at Pakistan’s Kahuta facility had reached 60%. In 1987, Pakistani nuclear scientist A Q Khan confirmed that Pakistan had the bomb. Islamabad conducted its five underground nuclear tests till now at the Chagai test site in May 1998.
One immediate concern about Iran’s nuclear progress is the impact on regional stability. Tehran’s neighbours, especially those with a history of regional rivalries, are likely to view this development with heightened anxiety. Inevitably, it bolsters Iran’s regional influence but also raises the spectre of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia -- with its own secret nuclear research centre in Jeddah – may, for instance, feel compelled to reassess its own security postures, potentially leading to a destabilising domino effect.
Moreover, Iran’s enhanced uranium enrichment capabilities have repercussions beyond the region. The global community, already grappling with a multitude of security challenges, must now confront the reality of an increasingly sophisticated and assertive Iran. The strategic implications of a nation with such advanced nuclear capabilities extend far beyond regional concerns, affecting the delicate balance of power in international relations.
The 83.7% enrichment level also poses a challenge to existing international agreements, particularly the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), signed in 2015, which was designed to curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions. JCPOA signatories, including the United States, China, Russia, and the European powers, must now reassess the agreement and consider possible revisions.
Past efforts by adversaries to block Iran’s nuclear progress have focused on monitoring key scientists like Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, a senior officer in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and a key nuclear scientist. Born in 1958, Fakhrizadeh earned his PhD in nuclear engineering from Tehran’s Imam Hussein University. He later pursued postgraduate studies in the field of nuclear physics at the Imam Ali Military University. His academic background provided him with the knowledge and expertise to become a leading figure in Iran’s nuclear research.
Fakhrizadeh’s career included leadership roles in various institutions, including the Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). He played a pivotal role in Iran’s nuclear weapons programme, overseeing scientific aspects and coordinating research and development efforts. His involvement made him a target for international scrutiny and led to his assassination in November 2020.
Another notable nuclear scientist was Shahram Amiri, who earned his PhD in nuclear engineering from Malek Ashtar University of Technology in Tehran. Amiri gained international attention in 2010 when he claimed that he had been kidnapped by the United States while on a pilgrimage to Mecca. He later returned to Iran under mysterious circumstances. In 2016, Amiri was executed after being convicted of spying for the United States.
Iran has also sent students abroad for advanced training in nuclear-related fields. Many Iranian scientists collaborated with countries such as Russia, China, Pakistan and North Korea, acquiring skills they later applied to Iran’s nuclear programme. Experts from the Khan Laboratories in Pakistan personally profited by helping their Iranian counterparts replicate designs of P1 and P2 uranium centrifuges, while a secret agreement signed with China in 1985 – subsequently modified under Western pressure – aimed at giving Iran expertise in plutonium production. When Saddam Hussein was pursuing the bomb, key Iraqi scientists were given shelter in neighbouring Iran.
Efforts to track their research led to cyberattacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities, such as the Stuxnet worm, widely believed to have been a joint US-Israeli operation. These cyber activities delayed but could not permanently block Iran. Inevitably, a nuclear Iran now must be taken into account in any emerging peace deal.
(The writer is a former Foreign Editor, Deccan Herald, a former Middle East
correspondent of the London Observer, and author of Nuclear Rivals in the Middle East, published in 1988)