Pakistan's turmoil: What’s in it for India?

Sharat Sabharwal is the former High Commissioner of India to Pakistan and author of ‘India’s Pakistan Conundrum Managing a Complex Relationship’.

Pakistan is in turmoil as it has been many times earlier and will continue to be periodically until it resolves its dysfunction. What does it imply for us beyond schadenfreude at the misfortunes of an implacable foe? Would a meltdown of the troublesome Pakistani state not be better for us?

Besides its identity dilemma, resulting in Pakistan defining itself as the antithesis of India, a key driver of Pakistan’s hostility towards India is the institutional interest of its army to sustain the India bogey for justifying its stranglehold over the Pakistani state. Imran Khan is the latest entry in the list of political leaders promoted by the army – Zulifkar Ali Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif – who turned against it. He feels jilted by the army chief Qamar Javed Bajwa and, while seeking an early election to cash in on his rising popularity, has openly and vehemently attacked the army leadership and their interference in governance and political affairs. This apparent challenge to the army conceals the continued realisation among all political players of its centrality in the Pakistani polity. Shorn of rhetoric, Khan has been urging the army leadership to give him an early election. Further, the ongoing political tussle has a strong subtext of who would be the Chief of Army Staff upon completion of General Bajwa’s extended tenure later this month. Each side is looking for an incumbent favourable to them. Therefore, few would put their money on Pakistan turning the corner quickly after long years of army dominance.

Also Read | Pakistan: Protégé turns against patron

However, questioning of the army by Khan and his supporters is unprecedented. It builds upon the trend visible over the last 20 years or so as a result of the information revolution and failure of army’s policies, resulting in the terror backlash in Pakistan in the first decade of this century. In 2020, Nawaz Sharif openly accused General Bajwa and the then ISI Chief, General Faiz Hameed, of driving him out of power. But he did so from the security of exile in London. Khan, on the other hand, has hit out at the army leadership in his speeches, while in Pakistan. Amongst those accused by him for the recent attack on him is the head of the ISI’s counter-intelligence wing. Fear, which, combined with strong-arm tactics used by the army against its opponents, underpinned its overbearing role, has clearly diminished. However, redressal of civil-military imbalance in Pakistan will be a process and not an event, will be driven by democratic impulses within the country and cannot be imposed from outside. Hence the significance of the above trend from our point of view. Such tendencies must grow if Pakistan is to become a normal state.

Pakistan has been a troubled and troublesome state not only for us, but also for the entire neighbourhood and indeed the international community. Former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright aptly described it as “an international migraine.” However, a meltdown of the Pakistani state will be no less troublesome. It will leave behind a volatile mix of extremism that will not leave us and the entire region untouched. Let us not forget the long lasting instability left behind by the collapse of the Afghan state following the exit of the Soviet forces in 1988-89.

We have little leverage over Pakistan’s internal developments. However, we need to adopt a more nuanced approach which, while countering and containing the Pakistani security establishment and its ecosystem, does not ignore the sizeable body of opinion there who realise the value of a stable relationship with India in their own interest.

(The writer is former High Commissioner of India to Pakistan and author of ‘India’s Pakistan Conundrum Managing a Complex Relationship’)