Karunanidhi agreed with Indira’s decision to cede Katchatheevu in private, but opposed it publicly: Book

Chennai: In June 1974, as Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, M Karunanidhi gave his ‘general acceptance’ to the then Foreign Secretary Kewal Singh regarding Indira Gandhi's government's plans to cede Katchatheevu Island to Sri Lanka.

However, Karunanidhi made it clear that, for "obvious political reasons," he could not publicly support the decision. This incident is detailed in a new book by former UN diplomat R. Kannan titled The DMK Years: Ascent, Descent, Survival.

Kannan, who has written biographies of Dravidian stalwarts C N Annadurai and M G Ramachandran, offers a detailed examination of Tamil Nadu's political history post-Independence, focusing on the pivotal role of the DMK.

The book, published by Penguin, traces the party’s evolution from its nascent stage, through its rise to power, its splits—first by MGR and later by Vaiko—and its survival as a dominant force for 75 years.

Kannan's book explores Karunanidhi's significant influence over Tamil Nadu’s political landscape and national politics from 1969 until his death in 2018.

Katchatheevu

As the DMK celebrates its platinum jubilee, Kannan captures defining moments in both the party's and the state's history, such as the ceding of Katchatheevu, the Emergency, MGR’s exit from the DMK, and the Sri Lankan civil war—events that continue to resonate today. The book also provides insights into the contentious relationship between Karunanidhi and Jayalalithaa.

On the Katchatheevu issue, now prominent due to the frequent arrests of Indian fishermen by the Sri Lankan Navy, Kannan notes that Karunanidhi put up a "fierce facade of opposition" to Gandhi's emissary, G. Ramachandran. He told Ramachandran that, to protect his "political turf," he would take a stand contrary to the Government of India, but advised that Gandhi should go ahead with the decision.

Kannan recounts that on June 19, 1974, Singh, accompanied by B.K. Basu, director of the historical division, met Karunanidhi in Chennai and secured his "general acceptance" to the ceding of Katchatheevu. Karunanidhi indicated that, for "obvious political reasons," he could not publicly support the decision, but he promised to "see that the backlash did not blow up."

Kannan adds that Singh received an assurance from Karunanidhi that nothing would be done to embarrass the government and turn it into a Centre versus State issue.

During the meeting, Kannan writes, Karunanidhi asked Singh if the agreement could be delayed by two years. When Singh mentioned concessions from Sri Lanka, Karunanidhi seemed to understand.

However, Kannan observes, "In his desire to rise to the occasion to become a statesman, he had not foreseen the difficulties ahead for the Indian fishermen and how the issue would come to haunt him." The book also records MGR's opposition to the ceding of Katchatheevu.

The Katchatheevu issue continues to put the DMK and Congress on the defensive, with the BJP branding them as "betrayers" of India’s sovereignty. Kannan also examines the DMK’s emergence as a national force, driven by Karunanidhi’s mastery of coalition politics by compromising on the ideology to ensure his party’s presence in central governments from 1999 to 2013.

Emergency of 1975

Kannan provides a detailed account of the excesses committed during the Emergency (1975-1977), during which Karunanidhi’s son M K Stalin was jailed along with over 1,000 DMK cadres.

The book suggests that for the first seven months of the Emergency, Karunanidhi tried to show that his government was implementing the 20-point programme, but he shifted his stance when Gandhi began considering dismissing his government.

Kannan quotes US Consul General notes from September 1975, which observed the DMK’s ambivalence. The Consul General noted that the DMK was "walking both sides of the street," with Karunanidhi praising the Emergency while his actions suggested otherwise.

Kannan also cites veteran journalist Kuldip Nayar, who noted that Karunanidhi was reluctant to take public action against the Emergency, although he did offer to help start an underground newspaper to be distributed outside Tamil Nadu.

In a chapter titled "Thamizhinath Thalaivar" (Leader of Tamils), Kannan discusses Karunanidhi's role as a fierce champion of the Sri Lankan Tamil cause. He watched tens of thousands of innocent civilians lose their lives as the Sri Lankan civil war came to a bloody end in 2009, while his DMK was part of the UPA-I regime.

"We will never know if his resignation as chief minister over the issue would have brought a ceasefire and saved the deaths of thousands. But Karunanidhi would have lived up to his self-declared title as Thamizhinath Thalaivar. He threw away a historic opportunity," Kannan writes.

Kannan contrasts the leadership styles of Karunanidhi and Jayalalithaa, noting that while the latter enjoyed luxuries and could conduct politics from her residence, Karunanidhi had to engage continuously with party affairs.

"Not a day passed without the DMK leader tending to party affairs at the party office, writing at the Murasoli office, touring the state," Kannan writes. Karunanidhi remained active until illness made it impossible, responding to almost every one of Jayalalithaa’s statements. "Ironically, the two depended on the other to be relevant," Kannan observes.

Postscript

The book concludes with an examination of the DMK in the post-Karunanidhi era, including its return to power in 2021 after a decade in opposition, and the challenges the 75-year-old party faces.

In a postscript written after the DMK's landslide victory in the 2024 elections, Kannan predicts a shift towards a multipolar contest in Tamil Nadu, with the BJP, NTK, and actor Vijay emerging as significant players.

"With the BJP, NTK, and actor Vijay crowding the political space, Tamil Nadu will likely move from a bipolar (led by the Dravidian majors) to a multipolar contest. A coalition era could be on the anvil. More choices bode well for the voters," Kannan concludes.