An inadequate long-term security strategy

Surgical strikes aren't enough. India needs cogent intent and should deploy a comprehensive of tools

Five years ago, India first publicly announced carrying out counter-insurgency operations on its neighbour Myanmar’s soil. Since then, India has gone ahead and executed similar operations along its western border against Pakistan in response to terror attacks. This suggests that India is now bolder in tackling attacks launched from neighbouring countries, but is that an accurate and complete representation?

A seminal moment

On June 9, 2015, the government’s minister Rajyavardhan Singh Rathore announced that Indian commandos carried out a counter-insurgency operation on Myanmar’s soil (though it is actually disputed territory). He stated that as retaliation for 20 Indian soldiers being killed by Naga militants in Manipur, the military conducted a ‘surgical strike’ on two militant camps operating along the border in another sovereign’s territory, which marked a first for the country.

This action, also referred to as ‘hot pursuit’ strategy, is a departure from India’s earlier efforts. In the past, while carrying out similar operations, India claimed that it has operated “alongside” but well within its borders. Many claim that India has long carried out operations in enemy territory but never acknowledged such actions. A departure from that practice highlights a desire to publicly raise the ‘cost’ imposed on those carrying out attacks against it.

However, India has not always been so bold. This was most apparent in 2002 and 2008 when India, sadly, demonstrated that no matter how significant the terror spectacle, it would make huge threats but would not follow up with action – either due to the lack of will or capacity.

In December 2001, after Pakistan-backed Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed terrorists stormed the Indian Parliament, then PM Atal Behari Vajpayee signalled to the armed forces to prepare for a full-fledged war – the start of Operation Parakram. A few months later, in May 2002, at the height of a fully mobilised army, the LeT escalated tensions by striking again and killing 13 Indian soldiers as well as their family members. Yet, Pakistan managed to escape unscathed despite a prepared Indian Army with nothing more than two press statements from the then Pakistani president General Pervez Musharraf half-heartedly announcing that his country will rein in terrorists.

The proof that the 10 month-long Operation Parakram did not amount to much lies in the 2008 Mumbai attacks. The 60-hour siege in the heart of India’s financial capital showcased the emboldened spirit of India’s neighbour and the reliance on use of non-state actors. Once again, we saw heightened tensions between the two, and in the end, the only way India could exact revenge was by hanging the lone surviving terrorist four years later, while mastermind Hafiz Saeed remained safe in Pakistan.

Actions speak louder

Both times, India may credit itself for being the more mature power – by not retaliating and starting an all-out war – but it did cut a sorry figure. Once, it moved a million soldiers without an end-goal in mind, for just a public announcement in return; the second time, while the attack may have helped remind the world that the Pakistani establishment is indeed a sponsor of terrorism, despite it assisting the US in its war on terror in Afghanistan, did India gain much more than global sympathy?

The threat of retaliation from a large military power, i.e. India, has fallen on deaf ears. Political scientist Joseph Nye believes that if the threats used in coercive diplomacy are not viewed as credible, it hampers the reputation of the coercing state and breeds more resistance in the target. This underscores why India’s constant threats have not dissuaded Pakistan from continuing with its ‘thousand cuts’ strategy.

Post-hot pursuit

India has since tried to remedy this blunder. Soon after conducting strikes on Myanmar territory, India remarked that it was a message to those “harbouring terror intent towards India”, which quickly garnered a warning from Pakistan. Not heeding the warning, India responded to Pakistan’s penchant for supporting terrorists by retaliating against the Uri attacks in 2016 and conducting a pre-emptive airstrike on terror camps in Balakot in 2019.

But we must ask the question: Is this posturing enough and does it reflect the harsh realities of South Asia? Despite the new proclivity to respond with a bang, insurgency and terrorism in India have not decreased. In fact, incursions into India have only increased, with the blessings of Pakistan. Hafiz Saeed, the co-founder of LeT, is enjoying the hiatus in legal proceedings against him in Pakistan despite being sentenced to 11 years imprisonment and a $10 million bounty on him. JeM leader Masood Azhar, on the other hand, has been declared missing by Pakistani authorities.

While a stronger response to attacks on its military establishments might help boost the morale of Indian soldiers, it cannot stop Pakistan from supporting terror groups, though it does increase the cost of such operations. It cannot be used to rein in China, which is stronger than India and provides Pakistan with a security blanket that enables it to act in a brazen manner. Currently, China itself is flexing its muscles alongside and deep within Indian territory in Ladakh and the North-East.

Surgical strikes on state-sponsored terrorist camps inside Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir or another other neighbouring country definitely help boost the morale of the forces and the citizenry at large. But this cannot be long-term strategy. Any effective solution will require parallel diplomatic, military and economic interventions to counter Pakistan, which is backed by a stronger-than-ever China. India’s efforts need a cogent intent all the more now when the dragon is intruding into Indian territory in Ladakh and the North-East.

(The writer is visiting fellow with the Centre for Anti-Terrorism Studies at the National Security Guard campus in Manesar)