Dealing with Russian spy wars in London

Colonel Sergei Skripal, a former Russian military intelligence officer, was found incapacitated in the middle of Salisbury, a medieval cathedral city, after being poisoned along with his daughter. The immediate media speculation and statements from British Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson alleged a Russian hand. Public reactions and media cacophony indicated a call for revised Russo-British foreign relations. However, the threat of Russian spy games in Britain bears greater national security implications than foreign policy ones.

Foreign policy pundits have already begun speculating about the potential responses Britain might consider against Russia. Some of them are to boycott the football world cup Russia is to host later this year, expel Russian diplomats from Britain - which it has done, as it had done in 2006, too, after the death of another former Russian intelligence officer and critic of President Vladimir Putin, Alexander Litvinenko - and levying sanctions against Russian businesses and investments.

The first two options have been tried in the past and had no deterrent effect on Kremlin. Over the decade, Putin has been empowering Russian intelligence agencies to pursue traitors, terrorists and criminals alike, both at home and abroad.

Against such a strong national security mandate, foreign policy tools of deterrence will have limited effect, if any, on a determined leader like Putin. Boycotting sporting events is a Cold War tactic which bears no profitable results. Expulsion of diplomats is the birth of a cold phase in bilateral relations which will thaw eventually, as observed historically.

Economic sanctions on Russia are not viable from the viewpoint of British foreign policy as well as domestic economy. On the foreign policy front, UK's desire to revive and sustain its global power stature has resulted in policies such as Brexit that makes it difficult for Britain to get EU powers like France and Germany to slap sanctions against Russia. In addition, Britain's relationship with the US is also not the friendliest, considering the recent interaction between President Donald Trump and Prime Minister Theresa May at Davos. Trump is reported to have expressed disinterest in visiting Britain until the public and press were more supportive of him.

That leaves only the unilateral sanctions option open, which is as shut as it is open given the sheer scale of bilateral investments. After the disaster in Gulf of Mexico, British Petroleum's investment in Russian oil production has been a lifesaver. And BP, in turn, has been lobbying for a Russia-friendly policy. On the other hand, the scale of Russian money flowing through the British financial system, both legal and laundered, is massive, especially in sectors like banking, luxuries, housing and stock market investments. Hence, the costs of unilateral sanctions on Russia are higher for Britain.

If Britain's own foreign policy woes are not sufficient, both countries are also locked in on other issues like Syria, Iran and North Korea, where Putin's cooperation is indispensable. Such complexities have emboldened Kremlin to pursue coercive foreign policy goals, while the Russian embassy in London vehemently dismissed allegations of complicity in Sergei's death and termed Johnson's statements as a "script of yet another anti-Russia campaign". Therefore, the actions of Russian intelligence have implications on national security more than foreign policy, and the British response is better sought by MI5 than by the foreign ministry.

Weak counterintelligence

The recurrent question Britain's Home Secretary Amber Rudd has had to answer is regarding the safety of the public. There has been a clear understanding that the attack on Sergei and Litvinenko, as foreign as their intentions may be, has had domestic implications. Therefore, these acts are seen within the matrix of hybrid threats to Britain's national security posed by foreign intelligence services. The MI5 and law enforcement form the first line of defence.

The primary counterintelligence failure that British authorities have to address is the smuggling of deadly poisons into the UK. In Litvinenko's case, the assailants had used Polonium-210, a highly radioactive substance. It was brought into the UK on two occasions. The first attempt on Litvinenko failed, but went undetected. Although the identity of the poison in the current case is yet to be established, the scale of lethality is similar to the earlier incident. Such security loopholes need to be fixed.

The threat of Russian intelligence to Britain must be viewed alongside the threat of Islamic terrorism - four incidents in 2017, criminal and money laundering operations, subversive activities mounted by Irish Republicans and Loyalists, and cyber espionage. Such a multidimensional threat perception has demanded that counterintelligence authorities be omnipresent yet walk the tightrope of safeguarding privacy.

In sum, Russian intelligence in Britain cannot be deterred through foreign policy means. The financial repercussions are too risky, and also counterproductive. The only way to protect British citizens from Russian secret warfare is by strengthening the domestic security apparatus, mainly cooperation between MI5 and local law enforcement agencies.

(The writer is a PhD scholar in Intelligence Studies and International Security at the University of Leicester, UK)