Give PLA reason to see reason

China has built up ability to launch offensives against DBO, Sikkim, Arunachal. It might be tempted to try its QBQR doctrine soon

During his recent visit to India, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi remarked that China does not seek a ‘unipolar Asia’. With his country’s all-important real estate sector precariously poised, Beijing’s questionable zero-Covid policy, and growing disconnection from western technological markets, this statement may not be disingenuous. What China does want, however, is a unilateral line of actual control (LAC) with India. This was the true intent and purpose of Wang’s visit to India. In some sense therefore, it was similar to Zhou Enlai’s visit to India in April 1960, which was also aimed at getting India to accept the Chinese version of the border. India did not agree then, and it hasn’t agreed this time either, as the Indian External Affairs Minister’s remarks show.

Indeed, the constant Chinese push to ‘de-link’ the overall relationship from the situation along the border is a means to gauge whether India is willing to acquiesce in an altered LAC. However, India’s unwillingness to restore ties to their previous trajectory, well conveyed by the refusal to let Wang Yi meet Prime Minister Modi, has sent a clear message to Beijing that anything short of status quo ante April 2020 is unacceptable to New Delhi. For the Chinese leadership, the question has presently devolved into a binary: Whether to resume the disengagement process with a view to slowly de-escalate and eventually de-induct, or to further increase military pressure on India in a bid to impose Beijing’s perception of the LAC via a ‘negotiated settlement’ subsequent to a limited conflict.

If China decides to exercise the first option, the Ladakh stand-off might end up becoming a long-drawn out affair akin to the Sumdorong Chu stand-off. A quick drawdown, in the absence of any visible new Indian leverage (similar or superior to what was achieved via Indian Army’s Operation Snow Leopard in August-September 2020), would be difficult for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to sell to itself and for Xi to sell to the Maoist faction within the CCP. While the PLA has used the stand-off to train personnel, fortify positions, try out new equipment, and refine command and control, besides initially “surprising” India, these gains will not be enough for the PLA to justify a quick de-escalation.

On the other hand, as time goes by, both the human and financial costs being incurred by the PLA in extremely inhospitable terrain will take away resources from other fronts. And in this scenario, the PLA will end up maintaining a rather expensive forward posture to deter the Indian military for a drawn-out period. In its bid to wear down Indian forces, the PLA will certainly introspect as to how much it is wearing itself down as well.

It stands to reason therefore that the option to escalate sometime in the near-future would also be under consideration at the Central Military Commission (CMC). PLA doctrine calls for resorting to a ‘quick battle for quick resolution’ (QBQR) by concentrating forces at specific points to make a recalcitrant enemy see reason. Naturally, any decision to initiate hostilities will be predicated upon an assessment by the CMC that the PLA will be able to achieve its aims in a limited conflict while retaining escalation control. Because if QBQR fails to daunt India, PLA doctrine calls for resorting to an in-depth strike. That would mean a much wider conflict with rather unpredictable outcomes, against a nuclear backdrop.

But wouldn’t the best time for China to precipitate a conflict have been in April 2020 itself, when Indian deployment was rudimentary, and the PLA Ground Force (PLAGF) had already occupied key screening positions? As it turns out, the PLAGF was also not as prepared then as it wanted to be. For instance, a large number of the soldiers concentrated to outnumber the Indian side at stand-off points were actually construction troops with questionable training. By Summer 2022, the PLAGF has, however, consolidated its positions along the LAC and has a greater number of acclimatised and trained troops. One should note that the road to 1962 began in 1959. Minor skirmishes laid the ground for campaign preparation and training, besides providing a readymade excuse for escalation in a tense environment. This protracted window for conflict also allowed Mao to begin the war at a time when the Soviet Union and the United States were locked in the Cuban missile crisis. And today, the war in Ukraine has Russia and the United States similarly consumed.

As such, the PLA is currently out in the field in Xinjiang and Tibet, ostensibly on annual exercises. Interestingly, the 76th Group Army (GA) which, along with the 77th GA, is one of the two main formations assigned to the PLA’s Western Theatre Command, has been joined by the 81st GA of the Central Theatre Command in firepower drills taking place in the Tarim Basin.

Also, armoured units from the Southern Xinjiang Military District are engaged in exercises in the Depsang/Soda plains. Meanwhile, tank units based in Lhasa are out on exercises with elements of the 77th GA in Eastern Tibet. The PLAAF has also increased its complex air operations training with multiple fighter types showing up at airbases on the Tibetan Plateau. As public reports reveal, the PLA has also been increasing the density and capability of its air defence units around vital installations in Tibet and close to the stand-off points in Ladakh. New recruits brought in this March are being assigned to logistics tasks, which includes maintaining a steady stream of food and fuel for forward brigades. PLA-wide blood donation camps have also been underway for some months.

Overall, the PLA has created the ability to launch PLAGF armoured thrusts against Daulat Beg Oldi (Depsang) and Northern Sikkim, with air cover provided by both ground-based air defences as well as PLAAF fighters. In Eastern Arunachal Pradesh, especially the Fish-tails area, the PLA has the ability to engage in its usual surreptitious salami-slicing endeavours.

For the Indian side, the path forward is quite clear. It involves building up at a faster rate than at present. Rather than restrain itself for fear that doing so would bring conflict sooner, New Delhi must understand that a stronger Indian posture, with a credible ability to project offensive force, is the best way to end this crisis quicker than would otherwise be the case. Not only must DBO and North Sikkim be fortified further, preparations that will convince China that a strike against India will not be limited in time and space must be advertised. Quite simply, the Indian military must give the PLA a reason to see reason.

(The writer is Chief Editor, Delhi Defence Review)