In the era of centralisation

The recent appointment of six governors and the reshuffling of seven governors is an interesting case. The appointments include senior leaders of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), retired army officials, and a former Supreme Court judge. The office of Governor is an imperial governance structure that has continued to persist in spite of its use as a political tool to control the elected governments at the state level by successive Union governments since Independence.

The appointment of governors was continuing on the basis of association or alliance with the party in power at the Union government. There is nothing new in these kinds of appointments; however, the recent appointments run into deeper aspects of the credibility of the independent institutions, such as the army and judiciary. The actions of governors in recent times in the country have revived the debate on the role of governors in the scheme of constitutional governance.

The appointments not only violate the recommendations of the Sarkaria Commission (1988), which delineated "four criteria for being appointed governor, including that the person should be 'eminent in some walk of life, should be a person from outside of the state, and should be detached and not too intimately connected with local politics of the state..". The Constitution makers envisaged a different role for the office of governor while replicating the same from the British legacy. The intent of the constituent assembly has three dimensions for the role of governor in the federal scheme of the Constitution, namely: (i) an organic link between the Union and state relations; (ii) specific responsibilities in the fifth and sixth schedule areas; and (iii) guardians of governance at the state level.

The recent tussle between the governor and the elected governments, most notably in Kerala, Tamil Nadu, and West Bengal, raises ample questions about the relevance of the office of governor in contemporary times. The partisan nature of the governor and, most importantly, his interference with the policies of the elected state governments is undesirable and depicts the loss of dignity and respect attached to the office of governor. In the Constituent Assembly Debates (CAD), three different opinions emerged on the role of governors. Members H V Kamath, T T Krishnamachari, Rohini Kumar Choudhari, Shibban Lal Saksena, and H N Kunzru opposed the discretionary powers, whereas Pandit Thakur Das Bhargava, Mahavir Tyagi, and Krishna Chandra Sharma were in favour of more powers for the governors. Dr B R Ambedkar and Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar had taken the middle path with regard to the discretionary powers of the governor.

The systematic erosion of dignity and respect attached to the office of governor has been greatly evident in recent times and calls for a serious discussion. In spite of the ugly incidents seen in the legislative assemblies during the conventional speech of the governor before a budget session, the pertinent question is whether we still need to retain the office of governor when its functioning is contrary to the federal scheme of the Constitution.

The centralised governance during the first two decades of independence (1947–67), the emergence of regional parties (1970–90), the consequential rise of coalition politics at national and state levels, the post-liberalization period (1991–2014), and the re-centralisation period (2014–present) have undermined the efficacy of the office of governor. The misuse of Article 356 by the governor more than 125 times since 1950 itself questions the credibility and legitimacy of the office; however, this has been on the decline since the S R Bommai v. Union of India verdict in 1994.

The 72 years of republic state in India and the functioning of the governors in strengthening and facilitating smooth governance between the Union and state governments are far from reality. Instead of focusing on this, all political regimes at the Centre have made efforts to consolidate power through the office of governor, thereby giving rise to the impression that they are "agents of the Centre" rather than the guardians of constitutional governance at the state level. The tussle between the governor and the elected governments is a consequence of this fallout of the constitutional role and its abdication by the office of governor.

The increased tension between the Union and state governments since 2014 is an indicator of the breakdown of Union-state relations. The passage of farm and labour laws is a glaring example of this breakdown of relations. The abolition of the Planning Commission and National Development Council, the poor functioning of inter-state councils, the centralised GST regime, regional bias in the devolution of funds, distortion of the school curriculum, bulldozer justice, and hatred among majority-minority communities are some of the direct consequences of broken Union-state relations. The office of governor has been used to create disequilibrium among relationships rather than facilitate and strengthen them.

The use of the office of governor to exercise political control by the Union government is a common trend, yet it must not become the rule of the game as it has in recent years. The use of constitutional institutions for the dominance of one or multiple parties in power is a classic case of politics of patronage. The Constitution of India envisaged a politics of social transformation through performative politics and good governance for the people through the office of governor. Such a practice of patronage politics goes against the spirit of the federal features of the Constitution and the principle of cooperative federalism. The persistence of power and patronage politics is detrimental to the welfare state and the directive principles of state policy.

By resorting to the politics of patronage, the Union government has deviated from its 2014 election promise of cooperative federalism. Under the guise of cooperative federalism, the country has seen more of a centralised or unitary state. Active participation of the state governments in policy decisions is the hallmark of cooperative federalism and is rarely seen in contemporary times. The politics of patronage is going to continue until the Union government in power reorients Machiavelli’s centralised state to Hegel’s ethical state.

(The writer is a PhD Fellow at the Institute for Social and Economic Change, Bengaluru.)