Reading message from Galwan correctly

India must see that China is geared up for a multi-act play and prepare itself to face what lies ahead

A failure on the part of the Indian establishment to understand the Chinese mind has ultimately led to a tragic turn of events wherein the Indian Army has lost at least 20 soldiers including a battalion commander to perfidy by the People’s Liberation Army Ground Force (PLAGF).

In my op-ed titled ‘India Must Stand Firm’ (DH, May 31, 2020), I had evaluated China’s Summer 2020 intrusions across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in light of a historical tendency on the part of Zhongnanhai to consolidate the Himalayan Frontier at times of internal tumult.

Due to this somewhat compelling Chinese objective, I had observed that India’s ‘traditional policy of pursuing confidence-building measures (CBMs) to dial down tensions will not work sustainably’. Unfortunately, this has been borne out with India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) squarely blaming China’s ‘violation of the status quo’ as the causal factor for the deadly battle that ensued between Indian and Chinese soldiers in the Galwan Valley during June 15-16, 2020.

As reports suggest and intelligence sources confirm, this engagement was precipitated by the PLAGF’s bid to take advantage of mutually agreed disengagement protocols that were being dutifully followed by the Indian Army. Specifically, instead of mounting a credible withdrawal to agreed upon positions, the PLAGF sought to reinforce itself close to an Indian post even as Indian troops were looking to pull back. Realising the PLAGF’s true agenda, Indian soldiers first sought to reason with their Chinese counterparts but were subsequently forced by the latter to defend India’s rightful claim. The ensuing melee resulted in casualties on both sides, but the Chinese disdain for previously agreed protocols is undeniable. External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar has now labelled this Chinese action as ‘pre-meditated and planned’. Simply put, the PLAGF was never in a hurry to withdraw.

And why would they be? Their ongoing intrusions are a result of a belief that this is the appropriate time for China to secure its Himalayan flank. Owing to the PLAGF’s recent modernisation, even as the Indian Army is still in the process of the same, and the near-completion of border works on the Tibetan plateau even as India’s own infrastructure development is still a work in progress, the Chinese would be forgiven for concluding that they hold certain advantages over India. Advantages, that may get eroded over the next decade as China’s own internal situation deteriorates and India recovers from the pandemic-induced shock. So, the Chinese strategy is simply to consolidate its own offensive potential across the Himalayas while denying the same to the Indian side as far as possible.

The PLAGF, in charge of implementing this strategy, has therefore intruded across ‘settled’ stretches of the LAC, such as the Galwan Valley, where it had already reached its 1960 claim line subsequent to the Sino-Indian War of 1962. But today, that claim line is no longer satisfactory for the Chinese because Indian infrastructure, despite delays, has improved along such settled stretches in Eastern Ladakh and will soon credibly increase India’s offensive potential. This is the logic behind China’s latest attempts to unilaterally ‘re-align’ the LAC to its gain. China is likely to attempt the same in Sikkim as well, given that the Chumbi Valley remains vulnerable to Indian action despite the PLAGF’s occupation of the Doklam Plateau.

An unfolding game

However, the PLAGF’s ‘activism’ ultimately stems from China’s perception that a pandemic-ridden 2020 is the best time for it to buy another ‘30 years of peace’ to quote Mao Zedong’s justification for the 1962 war which happened in the midst of the disastrous ‘Great Leap Forward’. Such a view of things sits well with the supposedly schematic ‘Chinese mind’ that admits a beginning of time but no end of time, as a former Australian diplomat and cultural intelligence specialist told me years ago.

So, an open-ended geopolitical game which is made up of attempts to secure periodic gains depending on the balance of power is quite in keeping with Chinese strategic behaviour. Indeed, the Chinese game of Weiqi, which involves grabbing as much of the board as possible through strategic misdirection, is an apt metaphor for China’s approach to the Himalayan game.

New Delhi must realise that Beijing’s ambition is to bind it further with new confidence building measures even as the PLAGF doggedly pursues a strategy of consolidation along the Himalayan frontier. Thus, it would be better for India to hunker down along the entire LAC if need be, than seem too eager for ‘de-escalatory’ talks that end up serving China’s large game plan. After all, the much touted disengagement agreement of early June 2020 that was negotiated to prevent the growing possibility of escalation has ended up causing precisely what it sought to preclude.

In that context, the just concluded foreign minister-level talks offer little hope for an early solution and indeed reports suggest that the Indian military forces have been put on high-alert. China has not entered the theatre to leave without a multi-act play. It is time India too girded its loins for whatever lies ahead.

(The writer is Chief Editor, Delhi Defence Review)