Time to draw red lines that neighbours must not cross

A PhD-holder in civil engineering and former Housing and Works Minister of the island-nation of Maldives, Mohamed Muizzu, has made it to the top of the country’s political hierarchy. Congratulations to him, especially because, at 45, he is probably the country’s youngest President. But Muizzu may do well to gather some wisdom rather than act in haste, especially in relation to Male’s ties with India.

The man is in an unseemly hurry to oust the Indian Army – actually 77 personnel of the Indian Army (yes, just 77) -- stationed in his country. The 77 men in three groups – one of 24 and another of 26 assigned to the operations of two helicopters and another of 27 men attached to a Dornier aircraft, all three flying machines donated by India -- were stationed in Male on the request of the earlier government there. These men did not enjoy any special benefits except diplomatic immunity, and were confined to their barracks and did not interact with civilians or the Maldivian political establishment. They were there because Male was eager to strengthen its security establishment and signed about a hundred agreements under the earlier President, Ibrahim Solih. All these agreements are set to be reviewed, according to Muizzu’s office.

Maldives was a British protectorate between 1887 and 1965, when it got independence (although the last British soldiers left only in March 1976) and it became Divehi Raajjeyge Jumhooriyyaa – the Republic of Maldvies (all three words in the name originate from Sanskrit or Tamil/Sinhala roots). The multi-religious and linguistic state was declared an Islamic Republic in 2008, non-Muslims were denied citizenship and parliament was forbidden from making any law that was not as per Islamic tenets.

New Delhi should have intervened then and impressed upon Male the need to maintain the island-nation’s secular character. Given its strategic location and proximity to us, Maldives’ character and orientation are sensitive issues for India’s overall Indian Ocean and Indo-Pacific strategy. Though fishing and tourism are the key economic activities fuelling its economy, its strategic importance has always been an important factor in India’s security and foreign policies, and lately in Chinese strategic calculus as Beijing has sought to make the Indian Ocean its ‘Western Ocean’.

While New Delhi enjoyed very friendly relations with Solih, Muizzu has not concealed his preference for Beijing, thus turning the clock back to the days of Abdulla Yameen, who had had shown a strong pro-Beijing tilt and organised “India Out” protests in Male. There is nothing to suggest that New Delhi was not aware of what was happening in its backyard in the run-up to the recent election, Muizzu having made his geopolitical preference public. It is not clear why New Delhi allowed the situation -- embarrassing, to say the least -- to come to this stage.

Muizzu should not forget that he needs India not only for security but he may need it to bail Maldives out from its looming debt crisis also. Most importantly, it’ll be India that will rush to rescue and host the island-nation’s 5-lakh+ people, should a rise in sea level threaten to drown the island chain.

Meanwhile, even as we are surprised by the pro-China tilt of the tiny island-nation in the Indian Ocean, the Himalayan Kingdom of Bhutan seems eager to settle its border dispute with China, the talks for which began in 1984 and have clocked 25 rounds to settle on areas along Doklam and other nearby ridges and valleys on the western border near the trijunction and Jakarlung and Pasamlung valleys along Bhutan’s northern borders. Beijing has also laid claim to Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary in eastern Bhutan.

China has made no secret of its intentions in building border roads as “governing border areas is the key for governing a country and stabilising Tibet”, as Xi Jinping put it. Part of this road will give the PLA a vantage position overlooking the Siliguri Corridor, about 12 to 17 km (as the crow flies or a drone can fly) from Jhamperi ridge.

It is clear as daylight that Beijing’s strategy is to encircle India in the Indian Ocean as part of its ‘String of Pearls’ game-plan of creating zones of influence in Maldives, Sri Lanka and Pakistan and to create pincer points in the north by building bridges with Bhutan and Nepal and in the East with Myanmar and Bangladesh.

New Delhi’s Act East and Neighbourhood First policies, soft power approach and economic cooperation have given India the necessary strategic footprint in these regions. But besides the carrot approach, Delhi must show the stick when they act against India’s security and strategic interests in their bid to play the China card with us. Let’s start by conveying to them the red lines they must not cross.