‘Brotherly’ but bedevilled: Pakistan-Iran relations

Focused on the Gaza conflict and its fallout, the global community was taken by surprise at the recent flare-up between Pakistan and Iran.

On January 16, Iran hit targets in the Panjgur district of Pakistan’s Balochistan province with missiles and drones and claimed to have destroyed two strongholds of the Sunni terror group Jaish al-Adl. Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian said that the attack was targeted against a terror group and “none of the nationals of the friendly and brotherly country of Pakistan were targeted.” Pakistan reacted angrily, described the Iranian strike as an “unprovoked violation” of its airspace, adding that it killed two children; and warned Tehran of serious consequences. 

It decided to recall its ambassador in Tehran and stipulated that the Iranian envoy to Pakistan, who was visiting his country, should not return. All ongoing and upcoming high-level exchanges with Iran were called off. Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, Jalil Abbas Jilani, said that Pakistan reserved the right to respond to the provocative act. Perhaps with an eye on India, he also said that “no country in the region should tread this perilous path.”

Less than 48 hours after the Iranian attack, Pakistan mounted a retaliatory strike in Iran’s Sistan-Baluchestan province against what it claimed to be the hideouts of the Balochistan Liberation Army and Balochistan Liberation Front.

Though both Pakistan and Iran do not tire of describing each other as brotherly countries, their relationship has been bedevilled over the years, not only by different perspectives on regional and international issues, but especially by the Shia-Sunni divide and perennial problems in managing their nearly 900-kilometre border. After the Iranian revolution, Pakistan became one of the key arenas of contest between Iran and Saudi Arabia, for the loyalty of Muslims around the globe. This resulted in widespread killing by extremist groups on both sides. Those killed in the 1990s included Iranian diplomats and Iranian air force personnel visiting Pakistan. 

A long history

In its struggle to control the restive Balochistan province, the Pakistan army has taken the help of Sunni extremists, including the banned Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. It has also harboured Sunni extremists targeting Iran. Jaish al-Adl has remained a bone of contention between the two countries, with Iran complaining often about its violent attacks in Sistan-Baluchestan. It has, in the past, held out the threat of its forces launching military operations inside Pakistan if Islamabad did not act against the group. There have been counter-complaints from Pakistan regarding Iranian security personnel crossing over to the Pakistani side to apprehend members of this group, with some incidents resulting in the exchange of fire between the two sides. Pakistan has also often complained of attacks in Balochistan mounted by Baloch nationalists from the Iranian side.

From the above, it is clear that the recent flare-up, though sudden, was not without a backdrop and context. But why did Tehran choose this time, when its hands were full in addressing the fallout of the Gaza conflict? The immediate provocation seems to have been an incident last month in which Jaish al-Adl attacked a police station in Sistan-Baluchestan, killing 11 Iranian security personnel.

Iran complained to Pakistan, but was not satisfied with its response. This was followed by the January 3 suicide bombing at a memorial event for the slain military commander Qasem Soleimani at Kerman, which killed close to 90 persons. 

There are reports that Jaish al-Adl may have facilitated the entry of a Tajik militant belonging to the Islamic State – Khorasan Province into Iran for the Kerman bombing. Moreover, the Iranian action in Pakistan came along with its strikes in Iraq and Syria, allegedly against an Israeli intelligence facility and an anti-Iran extremist group respectively. It is, therefore, possible that the Iranians either believed Jaish al-Adl’s recent actions to be part of the wider US-Israel effort to deter Tehran from widening the Gaza conflict, or they felt that Jaish al-Adl and possibly Pakistan could become a party to that effort. If so, the Panjgur attack may have been a warning to Pakistan not to take that path. 

Multiple problems

Having made their point, neither side has an interest in escalating further. Iran would much rather focus on the larger game in the Red Sea and beyond. Pakistan could benefit from low-level tensions with Iran in currying favour with the Americans, who were quick to condemn the Iranian strikes. However, facing multiple intractable problems, including the stand-off with the Afghan Taliban on the alleged Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) terror from Afghan soil, the last thing that Pakistan would want is a major escalation with Tehran. 

The TTP crisis with Afghanistan remains unresolved despite the recent visit to Pakistan by the Kandahar governor, who is close to the supreme leader Haibatullah Akhundzada. While threatening each other with action against terror bases on their territory, both Pakistan and Iran have maintained an overall conciliatory tone. Even as it condemned the Pakistani strike, the Iranian foreign ministry also spoke of Iran’s commitment to good neighbourly relations with Pakistan. The two foreign ministers have spoken to defuse tensions. 

China, which enjoys close relations with both countries, has called for restraint and has offered to mediate. Sensing that rising tension between Pakistan and Iran could play into the hands of the Americans, China would do all it takes to restrain them. Therefore, we are likely to see the situation de-escalating in the coming days. But unless the underlying cause — allegations of terror bases on both sides — is addressed effectively, there could be a blow-up again.

While describing the recent events as a matter between Pakistan and Iran, India has expressed understanding of the “actions that countries take in their self-defence” and called for zero tolerance towards terrorism. The Iranian action vindicates India’s position on Pakistan harbouring terrorists. However, it may be simplistic to expect the Pakistan-Iran flare-up to result in a radical change in the regional equations, particularly if both sides pull back from the brink. But any further escalation with Iran would add to the existing intractable problems threatening Pakistan’s stability. 

Growing instability there will not leave the region, including us, untouched. Therefore, while the region would hope that there is no further escalation, the preoccupation of Pakistan with even low-level tensions on the Afghan and Iran fronts should keep the appetite of its security establishment for adventurism against India in check. 

Further, the flare-up brought the wider conflict surrounding Gaza closer to us. Pakistan is desperate to rebuild its relationship with the US, especially to keep its economy afloat. Let us hope that it will not be short-sighted enough, as in the past, to enter into a transactional relationship with the US, especially in the context of their ongoing tussle with Iran, thereby bringing further misery both to itself and the region. 

(Sharat Sabharwal is a former High Commissioner to Pakistan and author of the book ‘India’s Pakistan Conundrum: Managing a Complex Relationship’.)