A Dragon-Druk deal imminent? China’s bid to drive a wedge between Bhutan and India

Prime Minister Narendra Modi made a special gesture, when he sent one of his cabinet colleagues, External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar, himself, to welcome King Jigme Khesar Namgyal Wangchuck at the Indira Gandhi International Airport as the Druk Gyalpo (Dragon King) of Bhutan landed in New Delhi on April 3 last. Jaishankar’s predecessor Sushma Swaraj had also personally received the Bhutanese King at the airport when he had last come for a visit to India on October 31, 2017. He had then with him his wife Queen Jetsun Pema and the couple’s one-and-half-year-old son, Crown Prince Jigme Namgyal Wangchuck, who had of course been the cynosure of all eyes during the visit and had taken with him to his home at the Lingkana Palace in Thimphu many gifts received in New Delhi – including wooden toys from Channapatna in Karnataka presented by then Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman.

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Wangchuck was not accompanied by his family during his recent visit to New Delhi. But, like the one in 2017, his visit this time was also overshadowed by the strategic rivalry between India and China, the two giant neighbours of tiny Bhutan. New Delhi had last hosted the Bhutanese King just a few weeks after the 72-day-long stand-off between the Indian Army and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) at the Doklam Plateau in western Bhutan had ended with both sides withdrawing troops. And, five years later, he returned last week for an official visit, with not only the armed forces of India and China engaged in another stand-off – much longer and much more widespread than the one in 2017 – along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh, but also the row over Doklam Plateau coming back into focus.

The King flew from Thimphu to New Delhi just a few days after an interview by Bhutan’s Prime Minister Lotay Tshering was published in the La Libre newspaper of Belgium. The interview stirred up the pot as it brought to the public domain that the negotiations between Thimphu and Beijing to resolve the protracted Bhutan-China boundary dispute had reached an advanced stage. Tshering said that a delegation of the Government of Bhutan had visited Beijing in February, while a “technical team” of the Government of China might arrive in Thimphu soon.

The territorial row between Bhutan and China covers an area of about 764 sq kms – 269 sq kms in western and 495 sq kms in north-central Bhutan. China in 2020 also staked claim onthe Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary in eastern Bhutan as part of its own territory. Bhutan of course rejected the claim made by China. Thimphu and Beijing had earlier held 24 rounds of boundary negotiations till August 2016. The negotiations, however, had remained stalled after the stand-off between the Indian Army and the Chinese PLA in Doklam Plateau.

The Chinese and the Bhutanese officials, however, had a meeting in Kunming in the southern region of the communist country in April 2021. The meeting led to the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on October 14, 2021 for “a three-step roadmap” to resolve the Bhutan-China boundary dispute. They had another meeting in the capital city of the Yunnan province of China from January 10 to 13 this year, when it was agreed to expedite the negotiation.

A section of media in India fixated on the Bhutanese Prime Minister’s comment on Doklam during the interview to La Libre. He said that the row over Doklam would have to be settled through three-way negotiations among Thimphu, Beijing and New Delhi, as the disputed area was located on the Bhutan-China-India tri-junction boundary point. This statement was in fact not alarming for New Delhi as it was in sync with its 2012 understanding with Beijing that all tri-junction boundary points among India, China and the third countries (Bhutan, Myanmar and Nepal) would be settled through trilateral negotiations. New Delhi had in fact cited the 2012 understanding to justify the Indian Army’s June 2017 move to resist the Chinese PLA’s bid to build a road well within the territory of Bhutan. The Indian Army’s resistance to the Chinese PLA’s move had resulted in the two-and-a-half-month-long military stand-off in Doklam.

What, however, caused unease in New Delhi was Tshering’s comment that Bhutan and China might be able to demarcate the boundary between the two nations after two or three more meetings. This triggered speculation that Thimphu might be willing to give up its claim over areas in the vicinity of Doklam in western Bhutan in exchange for Beijing narrowing or giving up its territorial claims in the north-central region of the tiny Himalayan Shangri-La.

Tshering’s denial of reports about China’s intrusion into Bhutan and construction of villages in the territory Bhutan also caused unease in New Delhi.

If China gains control over the entire Doklam Plateau, sans the tri-junction point, as well as the nearby areas, it will get a strategic advantage against India. The Chinese PLA will find it easier to conduct military manoeuvres aimed at blocking the Siliguri Corridor – the narrow stretch of land linking India’s North-East with the rest of the country.

As Modi hosted Wangchuck in New Delhi, India subtly reminded Bhutan the “intertwined and indivisible nature” of the security concerns of the two neighbouring nations.

The Prime Minister and the Bhutanese King reviewed the entire gamut of bilateral cooperation, including issues related to “respective national interests”, with New Delhi tacitly conveying to Thimphu that India-Bhutan ties were based on “mutual respect, trust, close understanding and sensitivity to each other's concerns”.

Thimphu sought to allay New Delhi’s concerns by pointing out that it would not only leave the Bhutan-China-India tri-junction point in Doklam out of the ambit of its negotiations with Beijing, but would also deny China access to the key Zompelri Ridge and would thus deny the Chinese PLA any opportunity to get a commanding view over the Siliguri Corridor of India. New Delhi, however, is not fully convinced though and is expected to cautiously keep tabs on Thimphu-Beijing talks.

The broad message Modi delivered to Wangchuck was that New Delhi would expect Bhutan to continue to be sensitive to the security interests of India while negotiating with China to settle the boundary dispute.

The 1949 Bhutan-China Friendship Treaty had been renegotiated a few months before the erstwhile kingdom had held its first democratic elections in December, 2007 and March, 2008. A clause that required Bhutan to be guided by India in conduct of its external relations had been removed. This had diluted the unique relations between India and Bhutan to a certain extent. But Article 2 of the new treaty also requires Bhutan and India to “cooperate closely with each other on issues relating to their national interests”. It says that neither government shall allow the use of its territory for activities harmful to the national security and interest of the other.

Beijing has since long been trying to spread its influence over Thimphu, but it could not yet establish formal diplomatic relations between Bhutan and China. It has been trying to drive wedge between India and Bhutan. The Indian Army’s continued role in supporting the Royal Bhutan Army in safeguarding the national security interests of Bhutan is obviously an obstacle for long-term strategic planning of China.

Bhutan is likely to continue to receive the largest share of India’s aid with allocation of Rs 2400.58 crore in the Union Budget 2023-24, up from Rs 2266.24 crore in 2022-23. Modi promised Wangchuck that India would step up its support to Bhutan's upcoming 13th Five Year Plan. India also accepted the request of Bhutan to extend an additional standby credit facility to the neighbouring country, over and above the two existing such facilities operating between the two countries.

New Delhi is likely to keep its purse-strings loose for Thimphu to dissuade it from drifting towards Beijing.