The New Global South

India’s G-20 presidency was marketed vociferously. Unsurprisingly so, given the approaching general elections. The mandarins of Indian foreign policy have waxed eloquent about India’s leadership of the ‘Global South’, a term that has gained great currency, especially with the expansion of BRICS at the Johannesburg summit last month. However, this ‘New Global South’ (henceforth NGS) entails at least as many (if not more) contradictions as the BRICS grouping itself. If we are to try and understand the changing world order, it is important to situate the NGS in a broader context, peel the rhetorical veneer of “developing world solidarity”, and clinically analyse what this means for geopolitics.

The first pressing question to address is: How do we understand the New Global South? What unites them, and where do they converge? Geography is, of course, no lodestar for determining who belongs in the NGS. Wouldn’t Australia and New Zealand have been part of it then? The line drawn between global ‘north’ and ‘south’ by former German Chancellor Wilhelm “Willy” Brandt was arbitrary – the idea of a division into a rich north and a poor, struggling, developing south no longer passes the test of geography.

What about economics? Even ignoring the more technical issues convoluting the basis of any economic classification of these countries, would countries like China (with a per capita income upwards of $12,000), UAE and Saudi Arabia (upwards of $30,000) qualify as ‘Global South’? Meanwhile, India, with a per capita income of about $2,000, seems to use “Voice of the Global South” synonymously with the mantle of leading the ‘developing world’.

Finally, there are those who claim that cultural issues, more than economic or developmental ones, distinguish the NGS. They claim that NGS is some sort of new keyword for a transformation of global culture – the triumph of eco-friendly indigenous lifestyles over globalist consumerism. This is hyperbole with little basis – partly because it hugely overstates the influence of these countries (which are far from a bloc yet), and partly because it omits the importance of the temporal entrenchment of cultural consciousness. McDonaldisation (as cultural globalisation was memorably called) was not a quick-time event – it was a consequence of years of soft and hard power influence, as well as a skewed hegemony over the instruments of cultural communication.

The only axis which creates minimal strain upon the analyst is the one that none of the NGS countries would be willing to openly accept: resentment. Resentment against western primacy, against past slights, and a strong desire to shape a world order that gives them the dignity that they’ve struggled for since the Cold War. The architecture of global governance was designed to their disadvantage. The institutions of multilateral negotiation – the United Nations system – lie discredited today, for none of the developing world’s calls for reforming multilateralism through steps like expanding the UN Security Council have ever been taken seriously. The world has always been inequitable for them, and now that some of them are seen as ‘geopolitical swing states’, they want to use this moment to shift the global consensus.

This is where we can dissect the strategic rationale fuelling the NGS. Calling this strategic moment a ‘new Cold War’ is an oversimplification; almost all dominant frames to understand the current moment are outdated, for they deify the power of the United States and China, and underplay both countries’ own dependencies. The current moment is one of rapidly shifting coalitions, ad-hoc groupings, and issue-based plurilateralism. Not all alliances consist of like-minded partners – some are marriages of necessity over principle. The BRICS expansion is a brilliant example.

When it comes to the NGS, the China-Russia axis cannot, of course, be ignored. Beijing’s control over these countries is not complete, for it has its own limitations. China is a net energy importer, requires continued access to the US-controlled global financial system, and is far behind Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the United States, and key European states in the design and manufacture of advanced semiconductors. Beijing is also cognisant about the scant prospect of benefits from supporting a sclerotic post-Ukraine war Russian economy, while Moscow’s increasing dependence on China has created deep anxieties for both. Moreover, most countries in this broad Global South patchwork recognise the staying power of the US, and calibrate their moves accordingly. They are looking to hedge against great-power traps. They may, for instance, refuse to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (much to Washington’s consternation), but they will not rush to be a Chinese ally at the risk of incurring American ill-will.

Washington, for its part, seems to have realised the precarity of alienating the middle powers. Biden’s 2022 National Security Strategy stood out because of its acceptance of differing security imperatives in Asia. Washington promised to “support [Asian states’] ability to make sovereign decisions in line with their interests and values, free from external pressure.” The emphasis on countries’ “sovereign decisions” marked a much-needed departure from the US’ familiar “with us or against us” attitude.

Countries like India have fostered strong strategic partnerships with Washington, too, creating another contingency: stratification of interests. In other words, many of the NGS countries could make their allegiance to the interests of the developing world issue-based. India will, for example, cooperate to expand trade and commerce and draw a clear line when it comes to supporting initiatives that serve Chinese interests, like ‘de-dollarisation’ through a boost to the yuan.

Similarly, countries like Egypt, UAE, and Saudi Arabia may milk the economic cow, while remaining steadfast when it comes to US  security guarantees. As C Raja Mohan has compellingly argued, this stratification of interests could foster conflict, and make formulations of the NGS (like BRICS) theatres of contestation in and of themselves.

Even the eternal optimist would thus have to think twice before viewing the New Global South as a bloc, or major balancer in the larger geopolitical game, yet. For the Sino-Russian nexus, this is an effort to build anti-Western clout. For the rest, this is an attempt to carve out a new niche for Middle Powers and shore up bargaining power to accelerate domestic prosperity. At a conceptual level, it tries to create an alternative site of imagining a new world order. Therein, the grouping will find that they have their task cut out for them.

(The writer is a student of political science at Kirori Mal College, Delhi 
University)